Complete Totalities by Shalom, Rafi
ar
X
iv
:1
10
7.
35
19
v5
  [
ma
th.
HO
]  
15
 N
ov
 20
11
COMPLETE TOTALITIES
RAFI SHALOM
Abstract. The cumulative hierarchy conception of set, which is based on the
conception that sets are inductively generated from “former” sets, is generally con-
sidered a good way to create a set conception that seems safe from contradictions.
This imposes two restrictions on sets. One is a “limitation of size,” and the other
is the rejection of non-well-founded sets. Quine’s NF system of axioms, does not
have any of the two restrictions, but it has a formal restriction on allowed formulas
in its comprehension axiom schema, which reflects a similar notion of elements
being prior to sets. Here we suggest that a possible reason for set antinomies is
the tension between our perception of sets as entities formed from elements by an
imaginary aggregation operator, and our wish to regard sets as existing “at once.”
A new approach to sets as totalities is presented based on a notion of “concur-
rent aggregation,” which instead of avoiding “viscous circles,” acknowledges the
inherent circularities of some predicates, and provides a way to characterize and
investigate these circularities.
1. Introduction
Naive set theory is known to be contradictory. The reaction to set theoretic para-
doxes appears to have been restrictive in the sense that it has been assumed that the
contradictions are a result of assuming too much. This is a natural response. How-
ever, by examining the restrictions imposed by two different foundational approaches
and their philosophical justifications, it would be possible to offer a new interpreta-
tion of set theoretic paradoxes. This interpretation asserts that the paradoxes are
a result of the tension between two equally fundamental aspects of sets. The first
aspect is related to the way we perceive sets and their elements, and the need to
“mentally reach” sets from their elements, and vice versa. This suggests an implicit
notion of precedence on sets which conflicts with another aspect we may wish to keep
in our mathematics - having a universe of sets free from hidden or explicit notions
of precedence.
This observation promotes the notion of concurrent aggregation, and leads to
a new conception of set, which is similar to the naive conception, yet one that
is an expansion of the conception of set rather than a restriction of it. In this
new conception, instead of trying to exclude circularities within the properties that
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define their respective totalities1, these circularities are allowed to surface. The
philosophical aspects of this proposition allow several insights about the way we
perceive sets, and the mathematical aspects provide an interesting new universe of
sets which includes a variety of sets required for “everyday mathematics,” and might
allow a different perspective on several set theoretic issues.
In section 2 we examine two restrictions that occur in cumulative hierarchies,
namely “limitation of size” and the rejection of non-well-founded sets (NWFS will
be used here to abbreviate “non-well-founded sets”), which are sometimes also re-
ferred to as “hypersets.” Non-well-founded sets are sets with infinitely descending
∈-sequences, such as sets that contain themselves as elements. Cumulative hierar-
chies may arise from the notion of an inductively generated set, or from the notion
that elements of a set are “prior to” it, in the sense of ontological dependence. Both
motivations are discussed in Boolos’ article on the iterative conception of set [3],
which is sometimes seen as a justification for ZF.
Even though the rejection of NWFS appears to be a less arbitrary restriction
than “limitation of size,” we try to gain a better perspective of it by examining it
through three different angles. The first is the existence of well-established theories
of NWFS, and their justifications. A second angle is the philosophical justifications
provided by Boolos for cumulative hierarchies. These justifications appear to stem
from an interpretation of sets based on the notion that elements of a set are “prior
to” it. The third perspective tracks down the conceptual differences between stage
or rank theories, such as Boolos’ iterative conception, and ZF which is assumed to be
motivated by these conceptions. While the assertion that all sets are well-founded
is a logical consequence of rank theories, and an integral part of them, in ZF it
is possible to exclude the regularity axiom (sometimes also called the foundation
axiom) which states that all sets are well-founded. We provide a simple motivation
for the axioms of ZF which stems from an immediate interpretation of the axioms,
that even in its strongest form does not imply the foundation axiom. We conclude
that ZF, unlike the iterative conception, is not necessarily based on the notion that
elements of sets are “prior to” them.
In section 3 Quine’s NF is discussed. NF does not include neither limitation of cu-
mulative hierarchies. Indeed Quine expresses concern about Russell’s interpretation
of the paradoxes, which limits our ability to define sets by quantifying over all sets.
However, Quine’s argumentation for NF is not alien to Russel’s type theory. It is
also explicitly mindful of the paradoxes, and the formal/syntactic limitation Quine
imposes on formulas in his specification axioms, namely “stratification,” is based
on similar notions of precedence. One of the possible motivations for NF, which
enhances the iterative conception with the possibility of aggregating sets from later
1By “totality” we mean the collection of all objects that satisfy some predicate.
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stages, and introduces aggregations that uses “placeholders” which results in circular
membership, shows that NF also has much in common with the iterative conception.
Finally in section 4 we present the notion of a complete totality, which applies a
form of aggregation we call “concurrent aggregation” to sets identified by a predicate.
Concurrent aggregation uses a form of aggregation with placeholders, but it is free
of stages, stratification, and other layered notions. The theory is characterized in an
informal way, and immediate consequences are reached.
2. Cumulative Hierarchies
One reaction to the paradoxes, fairly immanent and understandable, leads to a
view of sets as being “piled” in layers, each layer is “built from” sets from former
layers, which seems to demand two kinds of limitations on sets. The first limitation
is sometimes called “limitation of size,” and the other is the exclusion of NWFS.
There are many specific formulations and axiomatizations of theories that assert
these limitations (Russel’s theory of types, axioms systems of Morse-Kelley, and of
Von Neumann to name a few of the least recent ones). These limitations occur in
the widely used ZF and ZFC systems of axioms. Several philosophical justifications
have been offered to support such theories. A defensive motivation for a layered view
of mathematics is expressed by Russell [10]. Russell blames self-referential aspects of
the paradoxes as their cause. Boolos provides arguments for the rejection of NWFS,
and also positive incentives for a hierarchical universe of sets as part of his iterative
conception of set [3, 4]. This conception is offered as philosophical support for ZF,
which for Boolos and others is synonymous with set-theory. Since Boolos seems to
have the most systematic philosophical justification of this view of sets, we will be
mostly concerned with his argumentation in this section.
2.1. Limitation of Size. Cumulative hierarchies reject the notion of a universal
set, that is, a set that contains all sets. A universal set is not in itself contradictory,
and there are theories of sets that contain a universal set, such as Qunie’s NF [8].
However, a universal set cannot exist if we expect that every set has a power set, and
that the power set of each set has greater cardinality. In all versions of cumulative
hierarchies we always keep the latter assertion, and usually keep the former assertion.
Worse yet, in a cumulative hierarchy approach, a universal set usually leads directly
to the existence of Russel’s set by an application of a comprehension axiom. So in a
cumulative hierarchy there is a need to cut the hierarchy at some point and declare
that from that point on, the objects are “classes” rather than sets, or “too big” to
be sets.
As a doctrine, “limitation of size” determines which objects are sets, and which
are not, according to their size relative to that of other objects in a specific universe
of sets. In [4] Boolos provides, among other things, a formulation of “limitation of
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size” in two different ways, a stronger one and a weaker one. The only difference is
that in the weaker version we might not want to allow as sets some objects that do
not have a bijection with the class of all sets. He also provides a version of Frege’s
system with a modified rule V which avoids a contradiction by allowing only “small
concepts.”
This analysis of “limitation of size” by Boolos, allows him to deduce several aspects
of ZF that could not be accounted for by his iterative conception of set [3]. For
example, Boolos feels that the iterative conception can support stages (the equivalent
of ranks) up to the first uncountable ordinal or even only up to the first nonrecursive
ordinal, so he originally has to support the replacement axioms in ZF with a practical
consideration: “... the reason for adopting the axioms of replacement is quite simple:
they have many desirable consequences and (apparently) no undesirable ones.” Later
[4] he fills up this philosophical gap by noting that “limitation of size” can provide
what the iterative conception cannot, ending with the conclusion that: “Perhaps one
may conclude that there are at least two thoughts ‘behind’ set theory.”
However interesting “limitation of size” can be as a doctrine, it is indifferent to
the actual scope of the cumulative hierarchy, which leaves the question of “how big
is too big” open. There are many possible considerations, some more philosophically
grounded, and some are practical. Even some of the writers who aim to provide a
motivation for set theory, may not see the importance of argumentation about its
preferred scope. For example, Scott [12] provides an axiomatization of set theory that
aims to support ZF, and adopts a reflection axiom schema, which is fairly strong,
citing only practical considerations.
It would be impossible to survey all existing scope proposals and their justifica-
tions, but even without it, it is hard to imagine a good defense of any such decision.
For example, even if we are convinced that it is philosophically sound to use one of
the highly restrictive schemes, so that we are safer and still able to carry out most
of our mathematics, how can this be a foundations of mathematics when it excludes
perfectly good mathematics concerning large cardinals? The various restrictions that
end with this or that large cardinal seem also to be somewhat arbitrary. It looks as
though the only very “thick line” one can draw is between the finite and the infinite,
but very few would settle for a mathematics without the infinite. Thus while trying
to avoid set theoretic antinomies, our defense leads us to a scope of sets which is
either unjustified, too restrictive, or a combination of both.
This apparent foundational dead end may promote skepticism towards a founda-
tional approach to mathematics, or make one want to reject sets as a foundational
path. The set conception to be described in section 4 does not demand scope deci-
sions, and it supports a universal set.
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2.2. Non-Well-Founded Sets. Boolos is aware that “Unlike the naive and the
iterative conception, limitation of size (in either version) is not a natural view, for one
would come to entertain it only after one’s preconceptions have been sophisticated
by knowledge of set theoretic antinomies ...” However it remains to be seen to which
extent can Boolos’ stage theory be called natural, and if another form of restriction
it imposes, namely the rejection of NWFS, is as justifiable and free from being a
reaction to the paradoxes as Boolos thinks.
Unlike the “how big is too big” issue, asserting that only well-founded sets can
be considered sets is generally accepted, and considered natural. The situation is
less vague because there is a distinct line that separates well-founded sets from non-
well-founded sets. Stage or rank theories such as Boolos’, with the set conception
they provide, are usually taken as good philosophical justification for the rejection
of NWFS, and as a basis for ZF. The ZF system of axioms contains the axiom of
regularity, which rejects the existence of NWFS. Thus sets are assumed to be well-
founded in any usual context.
On the other hand, it is relatively well known that a theory of NWFS is possible
and even useful. Peter Aczel [1] provided a unified framework for dealing with NWFS,
based on slight modifications of ZF. The regularity axiom is the only one that has
to be rejected, and several anti-foundation axioms are offered that differ only by the
strength of the criteria for set equality.
Aczel devised a way to describe sets as “decorations” of directed graphs in which
one of the vertices represents the set, and edges describe membership. Vise versa,
graphs can be a “picture” of sets, well-founded or otherwise. This graph description
of sets makes it easy to describe NWFS, sometimes in a finite way. This is though
NWFS appear to be infinite objects because they always have an infinite ∈-sequence.
For example, The non-well-founded set which is a singleton containing itself, which
Aczel denotes by Ω, can be described as the decoration of a graph composed of a
single vertex with a self loop. There are many other graphs that are pictures of this
set, some of them are infinite, but the fact that NWFS should not necessarily be seen
as infinite objects did not escape Aczel: “But a moment’s thought should convince
the reader that Ω is a finite an object as one could wish. After all it does have a
finite picture.”
Equality for NWFS is a more delicate issue than for well-founded sets, because
sets can be members of themselves (or members of members etc.) which obviously
influences the usual extensionality rule for set equality. The usual extensionality
rule is not only unable to equate two “different” singletons containing themselves.
Some relatively complicated looking sets such as the ones depicted by the equations
Ω1 = {Ω2,Ω3},Ω2 = {{Ω2}},Ω3 = {Ω2} may also be equated to Ω. A unified
framework is presented by Aczel to handle his own suggestions and previous work on
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the subject of NWFS. The framework allows a systematic description of several anti-
foundation axioms which differ by the strength of the identity criteria they impose.
This aspect of NWFS will be revisited in the set conception we present in section 4,
for which such set identity considerations are important.
The challenge posed by a systematic and useful theory of NWFS to the cumulative
hierarchy notion of a set is stated clearly in a foreword to Aczel’s book written by Jon
Barwise: “Aczel’s work was motivated by work of Robin Milner in computer science
modeling concurrent processes. The fact that these processes are inherently circular
makes them awkward to model in traditional set theory, since most straightforward
ideas run afoul of the axiom of foundation.” But the resulting theory by Aczel which
adopts NWFS while using standard techniques from set theory results in a linguistic
problem: “However, there is a serious linguistic obstacle to this work, arising out
of the dominance of the cumulative conception of set. Just as there used to be
complaints about referring to complex numbers as numbers, so there are objections to
referring to non-well-founded sets as sets. While there is clear historical justification
for this usage, the objection persists and distracts from interest and importance of
the subject.”
Barwise’s comparison of NWFS with the extension of the conception of number
to include complex numbers does less justice to NWFS than they deserve. NWFS
should not be seen as legitimate because they are a way to widen the conception of set,
which is a usual mathematical practice well described by Meir Buzaglo [5]. NWFS
were rather rejected as a result of consistency concerns raised by set antinomies.
Mathematical objects such as the universal set, and the naive conception of set,
are earlier than the cumulative conception. This is probably what Barwise means
by a “clear historical justification” for NWFS. But even if NWFS were “just” a new
mathematically well established expansion with useful applications, we would still be
inclined to let NWFS be seen as perfectly good sets, instead of having to awkwardly
skip between the terms “set” and “hyperset” whenever hypersets are deemed useful.
2.3. Contemplating the Case for Sets Being Strictly Well-Founded. There
are several good reasons why the cumulative conception of set has become so dom-
inant. Even without looking up the justifications for it in the literature, one can
clearly appreciate the advantages of a theory of sets that arises from a series of cre-
ations of sets from former sets, and it is natural that one would adopt such a view
given the knowledge of set antinomies. The antinomies seem to warn us from circu-
larity in our membership relation, and “constructing” sets layer by layer from former
ones accommodates a reassuring feeling of consistency, because we do not expect
that the acceptance of the “new” sets we “produce” can create a contradiction. The
inductive presentation is also similar to the way we usually think about the natural
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numbers. We concentrate on Boolos’ argumentation on the subject that seem to
reflect these sentiments.
Concerning argumentation for well-foundedness of sets there can be two basic
attitudes - a rejection of NWFS, and claiming that a set conception that includes
only well-founded-sets is preferable. Both of them are expressed by Boolos. Boolos
argues against NWFS in [3] by saying that “It is important to realize how odd the
idea of something’s containing itself is.” Admittedly, the idea of an x such that
x ∈ x is a bit odd, but can this make a good philosophical argument? After all, all of
mathematics is a bit odd, including usual set theoretic concepts Boolos accepts such
as the empty set, singletons, and the axiom of choice. Boolos reminds us in a different
context [4] how odd the idea of a set with a single element, and it being unequal
to the element within it, may seem to a non-mathematician. Some of the oddest
ideas in mathematics are also some of the most powerful ones. Are infinitesimals
and
√−1 less odd than a universal set? Ultimately mathematicians are concerned
with the usefulness of a theory, not its likelihood. The problematic concepts can
always be removed. Just like the way the complex numbers can be described as a
field of ordered pairs of real numbers, thus excluding
√−1 from the theory, NWFS
can be represented by graphs, thus eliminating the concept of circular membership.
Boolos is aware that “There does not seem to be any argument that is guaranteed
to persuade someone who really does not see ... that these states of affairs are
peculiar.” Much less this would affect someone who agrees that this may be peculiar,
yet does not see a major problem.
The other side of the same coin is Boolos’ assertion that the iterative conception
he describes later using a “rough description” of sets being accumulated in stages,
and with its formalization with stage theory, is “natural.” This is supposed to
validate the theory as one that has its own justification regardless of the paradoxes.
Boolos’ argumentation is as follows: since naive set theory is contradictory “one
might come to believe that any decision to adopt a system of axioms about sets
would be arbitrary ... if consistent, its consistency would be due to certain provisions
that were laid down for the express purpose of avoiding the paradoxes that show
naive set theory inconsistent, but that lack any independent motivation.” Contrary
to that, Boolos claims this the iterative conception “often strikes people as entirely
natural, free from artificiality, not at all ad-hoc, and one they might perhaps have
formulated themselves.”
Boolos may be right about the conception being natural, but what could be the
implications of having a natural conception of a mathematical entity? Does it mean
that this is the only way we can interpret it, or rather that investigating it according
to that conception has merit? There is no dispute that limiting our attention to
well-founded sets, and working within a framework that ensures that all sets have
a rank is convenient and beneficial in many cases. This means that choosing to
8 RAFI SHALOM
work in a universe of well-founded sets is legitimate, but it does not mean that our
set conception has to exclude NWFS. The natural numbers are probably the most
natural, “not at all ad-hoc” and “easy to formulate” mathematical concept one can
imagine, and their theoretical value as a subclass of numbers cannot be denied, yet
the real numbers are as much numbers as the natural numbers.
It could be the case that Boolos did not intend to claim that the iterative concep-
tion should be regarded as the only way to conceptualize set theory, but only as a
way to motivate ZF. However, he does explain his view of how the term “set” should
be understood. In the beginning of that article Boolos discusses Cantors’ definitions
of the term. Boolos thinks Cantors’ definitions are vague, but for him (justifiably
or not is a different question) the definitions “... do suggest - although, it must
be conceded, only very faintly - two important characteristics of sets: that a set is
‘determined’ by its elements ... , and that, ... the clarification of which is one of the
principle objects of the theory of the rationale we shall give, the elements of a set
are ‘prior’ to it.” No wonder later Boolos explains the alleged strangeness of NWFS
by saying that “For when one is told that a set is a collection into a whole of definite
elements of our thought, one thinks: Here are some things. Now we bind them into
a whole. Now we have a set.”
As we shall see in the next section, the exclusion of NWFS is a logical consequence
of this notion of priority induced by the membership relation, though it seems Boolos
was unaware of that at the time. There are also reasons to believe that the iterative
conception and ZF have completely different motivations, which makes the suggestion
that the iterative conception motivates at least a part of ZF questionable.
2.4. Regularity in ZF and in Stage Theory. If we reject Boolos’ philosophical
arguments that lend support to regularity, it may still be possible to support reg-
ularity as an integral part of ZF by noticing that regularity logically follows from
rank theories such as the iterative conception, and adding the assumption that the
iterative conception is a justification of the parts of ZF that include regularity.
Regularity is indeed an integral part of the iterative conception and other rank
theories. The fact that regularity is implied by stage theory initially escaped Boolos.
This made him introduce set theoretic induction2 in his original presentation of
stage theory. The argument for the adoption of the induction axiom was that the
conception indicates that sets are inductively generated. After laying out the axioms
of stage theory Boolos adds that “There is still one important feature contained
in our rough description that has not yet been expressed in the stage theory: the
2Set theoretic induction means that for every property P the statement ∀x((∀yy ∈ x→ P (y))→
P (x))→ ∀xP (x) holds. For the version in Boolos’ stage theory we first say that a stage is covered
by P if P holds for all sets formed at that stage. Then set theoretic induction is: if each stage is
covered by P provided all lower stages are covered by P, then all stages are covered by P.
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analogy between the way sets are inductively generated by the procedure described
in the rough statement and the way the natural numbers 0,1,2, ... are inductively
generated ...” Thus for Boolos, regularity must follow from the iterative conception.
In theories that make stages or ranks of sets explicit, and have a comprehension
axiom schema that quantifies over sets of limited rank, it is possible to deduce set-
theoretic induction. Such deductions appear in a more compact version of Boolos’
stage theory [4], in a theory by Dana Scott that uses membership of “partial uni-
verses” for ranking [12], and in an axiomatization by James Van Aken [2], which
includes an axiom that defines a two place relation that supports the notion of “pre-
suppositional strength” of sets, which is similar to ranks. Set theoretic induction is
an essential part, and not merely a logical consequence of such systems. It is easy
to notice this in Van Aken’s system that has two basic axioms (the above mentioned
axiom that defines a relation for set comparison according to their rank, and a com-
prehension axiom schema that uses this relation) responsible for the derivation of all
the usual ZF axioms Boolos’ stage theory supports. Remove one of the two axioms
and the system collapses. This “all or noting” situation occurs also in the other two
axiomatizations.
If we accept Boolos’ thesis that stage theory supports ZF without replacement
and extensionality (and without choice if ZFC is to be justified), accepting regularity
as an essential part of ZF is unavoidable. Actually this would mean that we also
have to accept the power set axiom, which is derivable from such axiom systems,
provided there is no maximal rank3. To show that this is not the case there is a
need to explain what makes regularity “stick out” in ZF and ZFC, and to trace the
“thought” behind ZF which is “simple”, “natural”, “not at all ad-hoc” from which
the axioms supported by stage theory can be deuced, except regularity.
A careful look at ZF and ZFC should help us find a common theme. It is noticeable
that most of the ZF axioms are assertions about set existence, usually given the
existence of other sets. Most of the axioms can be interpreted to say something like:
“given this or that set (or sets) there is a set such that ...” or “there is an infinite
set.” There are only two exceptions. One is extensionality which equates sets that
have the same elements, and has a special status in various axiomatizations of set
theory. The other exception is regularity which imposes a condition on sets, and is
actually the only axiom in ZF that disqualifies sets. Thus it would be fair to say that
in ZF (and also in ZFC since the axiom of choice also adheres to the above pattern
of axioms of ZF), regularity is rather the “odd man out.”
3Actually it is possible to create a Van Aken style system in which the two place relation is relaxed
not to indicate strict rank, and the power set axiom follows directly from such a comprehension
axiom, but this is beyond the scope of this article.
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How can we characterize the “thought” behind this pattern? Unlike the situa-
tion in the “rough description” that Boolos uses in order to motivate the iterative
conception, these sets are not simply built using “previous” sets, so the movement
is symmetric - not only from elements of a set towards the set, but also from sets
towards their elements. This means that given a set we ask ourselves which sets can
be “reached” or “constructed” given other sets. The following simple notion of set
construction follows: for all x, x is 0-constructible from x. y is n-constructible from
x if every z ∈ y is up to (n − 1)-constructible from x, or if there is a z which is up
to (n − 1)-constructible from x and y ∈ z holds. In other words, if we can we get
from x to y within n aggregations and disaggregations of sets we already have, y is
n-constructible from x. We are allowed to aggregate and/or disaggregate all the sets
we have at once at each stage. For example, getting the union set of a certain set
requires (at most) disaggregating the set to its elements, doing the same for the ele-
ments, and aggregating what we got. A union set of x is thus always 3-constructible
from x. Note that according to the above definition, the empty set is 1-constructible
from any set, because all the elements of the empty set are 0-constructible from any
set, which might not coincide with the original intuition, but this is not important
for the point we are about to make.
Even without formalizing this concept it is trivial that the regularity axiom cannot
be deduced from a comprehension axiom scheme that quantifies over sets that are
n-constructible from other sets. Even if we take a very strong version of this axiom
that allows starting from more than one set, and quantifying over anything that
is finitely constructible4 (that is, n-constructible for some natural n) from them,
we can prove many ZF axioms - unordered pairs, power set, union, comprehension,
and even infinity - but not regularity. This would be easily provable by deducing
the version of comprehension that quantifies over finitely constructible sets from ZF
without regularity, plus the known fact that ZF without regularity does not imply
regularity. Indeed, this form of creating sets from other sets does not seem to be at
odds with the existence of, say, the set Ω mentioned earlier. Actually, this concept of
set creation does not seem to be at odds with one of Cantors’ definitions for sets that
Boolos quoted: “any collection ... into a whole of definite, well-distinguished objects
... of our intuition or thought.” A definition is expected to be a two way street. If
we know the set when we know its elements, shouldn’t we know the elements when
we know the set?
If this analysis of the conceptual framework of ZF is true, there should be more
suspicion towards assumption that regularity is a part of “a thought behind ZF”.
4A formalization of “finitely constructible from x” does not require a notion of a natural number,
and it is easy to formulate in the language of set theory using first order logic with a single type.
Since the technical details are fairly straightforward, we refrain from such a detailed exploration
here.
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The assumption that the cumulative approach is essential to ZF is taken for granted
by Scott, for example, when he lays out his axiomatization of set theory [12]: “Now
Russell made his types explicit in his notation, and Zermelo left them implicit. It
is a mistake to leave something so important invisible, because so many people will
misunderstand you.” Perhaps the misunderstanding belongs to Scott, and Zermelo
never considered hierarchical notions as a key feature of his set theory.
This does not mean that rank theories are not a good way to describe a natural
conception of set. Boolos’ rough description is similar to a description of the natu-
ral numbers using zero and the successor operator. Boolos’ stage theory relates to
his advocated set conception the way Peano’s axiom system relates to the natural
numbers. The result is a much required description of a subclass of sets.
To summarize, rank theories essentially include the idea that sets are inductively
generated, and make ranks of sets explicit in their axiomatic development. As a
result, regularity and other set theoretic consequences are derivable. There is no way
to exclude regularity in such axioms systems without rendering them meaningless
and dysfunctional. Conversely, in ZF regularity is detachable. This is probably
because ZF is an axiom system motivated by the idea that the role of set theoretic
axioms is to describe the universe of sets by separate assertions about the existence of
sets, thus unlike what Boolos thinks, rank theories do not reveal “a thought behind
ZF,” but they are a completely different way to perceive sets, which is much more
restrictive in some respects.
3. Quine’s New Foundations
There is one long-standing and relatively well known axiomatization of sets that
does not contain either of the two restrictions mentioned in the previous section.
Quine’s New Foundations (NF) [8] axiom system is simply an extensionality axiom
with a comprehension axiom schema that allows the totalities of predicates defined by
formulas in the language of set theory which are “stratified.” Stratification demands
that the variables on both sides of the ∈ relation in subformuals of the formula can
be enumerated in a non circular way. Specifically, there has to be a function f from
the variables of the formula to the natural numbers such that if x ∈ y is a subformula
f(x) + 1 = f(y) holds, and if x = y is a subformula f(x) = f(y) holds. Stratified
formulas are similar to formulas in Russell’s theory of types, without explicit types.
Since the property x = x is allowed, a universal set exists, and since x /∈ x
is not allowed, Russell’s paradox is avoided. The universal set in NF is both an
example of allowing “big” sets, and of allowing non-well-founded sets. This means
that the “ontology” derived from NF and from hierarchical theories is very different.
Unsurprisingly each side argues against the other. The arguments we detail bellow
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can teach us about the limitations of both approaches, but once we trace possible
motivations for NF, several similarities become apparent.
Quine is not pleased [9] with Poincare´’s and Russell’s view of the paradoxes, and
with the cumulative hierarchy approach. According to the conception advocated by
Poincare´, Russell, and others, the paradoxes are a result of “vicious circles” and “im-
predicative definitions” i.e., definitions of sets with variables that may range over the
defined set. Quine explains why there should be no problem with the kind of specifi-
cations Poincare´ warns about and calls impredicative: “A circular argument seduces
its victim into granting a thesis, unawares, as a premiss to its own demonstration. A
circular definition smuggles the definiendum into the definiens ... But impredicative
specification of classes is neither of these things.” Thus “Impredicative specification
is not visibly more vicious than singling out an individual as the most typical Yale
man on the basis of averages of Yale scores including his own.” Quine stresses that
this interpretation seems to imply an unintended temporal view of sets: “For we are
not to view classes literally as created by being specified—hence as ... increasing in
number with the passage of time. Poincare´ proposed no temporal implementation
of class theory. The doctrine of classes is rather that they are there from the start.”
He concludes that “... the ban urged by Russell and by Poincare´ is not to be hailed
as the exposure of some hidden ... fallacy that underlay the paradoxes. Rather ...
to thin the universe of classes down to the point of consistency.”
It seems that Quine’s objection to a hierarchical conception of sets stems from his
endorsement of definitions that quantify over all sets. According to Quine only defini-
tions of mathematical concepts and deductions should be organized in an expository
manner - “first thing’s first.” A reference to mathematical objects in our domain is
something else. Boolos rather claims, following Dan Leary that: [4] “the metaphor of
formation of sets at stages may arise from a certain narrative convention or principle
of good exposition ...” Yet Quine seems to think that an expository approach is
incompatible with the way we perceive and refer to mathematical objects.
On the other hand, Boolos voices [3] the expected criticism of NF for seeming
artificial, and lacking a simple motivation independent of the paradoxes. Referring to
Quine’s systems NF and ML, Boolos says that: “Other theories of sets, incompatible
with ZF, have been proposed. These theories appear to lack a motivation that is
independent of the paradoxes in the following sense: they are not, as Russell has
written, ‘such as even the cleverest logician would have thought of if he has not
known of the contradictions.’ [11]” Boolos points out that Quine’s NF lacks a clear
motivation, and appears to be artificial. A question mark hovers over NF, because
the reasons for accepting only stratified formulas are not clear, which makes NF look
like a cleverly ad-hoc way to grab as much as possible while eliminating what we
know to be paradoxical just because we are aware of the problem.
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Quine does not detail his philosophical considerations for NF in [8]. Later [7] he
provides a way to reach his theory through the formalism of type theory. Stratified
formulas can be seen as formulas of the theory of types for which the types of the
variables have been removed, which is a form of what is known as “typical ambiguity,”
[14] which Quine mentions in that article. This results in a theory with a single type
in which what is true within each type of Russell’s theory of types (such as having a
“universal set” relative to each type), becomes true for the single type of NF.
Quine states his motivation as a way to avoid set antinomies. After examining
problematic properties of sets, he finds fault in unstratified formulas and states within
this process that: “We are trying to purify our language of idioms which might
deceive us into contradicting ourselves.” Then he argues that since stratified formulas
are formulas of type theory without the types, this should help keep NF free of
contradictions, for: “if the theory of types is adequate at all as a safeguard against
contradictions, it must be adequate in its formal aspect alone.” One may wonder
how is that different from an attempt to “thin the universe of classes down to the
point of consistency.”
If Quine performs a mere clever formal trick in that article, Boolos would be right
about Quine’s approach. Following Ernst Specker [14], it turns out that typical
ambiguity has more to it than meets the eye at first glance. It is applicable to
other fields of mathematics, and it is relevant to the consistency of NF [15]. But
a motivation for NF which is not formal, and free from complicated mathematical
notions has to be sought elsewhere. Holmes [6] wrote an article in defense of NF as a
framework for set theory. However, the suggested philosophical basis Holmes provides
is hardly intuitive, involving notions such as abstract data types when the perception
is roughly stated, and “functions,” “machines,” “addresses,” and “programs” when
the idea is made more explicit.
A more intuitive and graphic suggestion by Sharlow [13], which is an extension of
the iterative conception, is supposed to support NF. Sharlow begins with the usual
iterative conception, but loosens the demand that all collected sets are formed at
earlier stages. Sets (and their singletons that appear in the next stage, etcetera),
can now be assumed to exist as part of their formation. Thus, for example, a set
S = {∅, {S}} can be formed in the level immediately above the level in which ∅ is
formed, because if we assume S can be created there, then {S} would be formed
in the next level, and the theory allows collecting sets inspired by S that appear in
later stages.
Sharlow explains this kind of set formation by using “placeholders” or by thinking
all sets exist at once: “... we can think of the act of placing {S} in S as an act
of dropping a placeholder into the set S and making a mental note to replace the
placeholder with {S} after {S} comes into existence. Alternatively, if we want to
think of all sets as existing at once, then we can think of ourselves as adding to S an
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already existing element which we know must exist once we have created S.” This
leaves Sharlow with the need to discuss the difference between self-defeating and non
self-defeating properties in his set conception, and show why paradoxical sets are not
formed this way. We will encounter the placeholder approach as part of the notion
of “concurrent aggregation” we devise for a new set conception in section 4.
In summary, the idea of “typical ambiguity” shows that NF and the theory of
types are not as distant as it might seem at first glance. Also, following Sharlow, a
simple motivation for Quine’s NF based on the iterative conception is possible. The
philosophical rivals that adhere to Russell’s type theory and Boolos’ stage theory on
the one hand, and Quines’ NF on the other hand, seem to be closer to each other than
they might acknowledge. The layered notions Quine rejected are reflected within the
formulas admissible in the comprehension axiom schema of NF. Quine’s criticism
can now be turned against his own theory. Just like sets, all set properties are
supposed to be indifferent to imposed order. How can we justify the rejection of
some properties by forcing the variables to be ordered according to their appearance
in subformulas? Instead of assuming that elements are prior to their sets, in NF
variables that represent elements are prior to variables that represent sets. It looks
as though we simply shifted the ordering from sets to variables.
4. Complete Totalities
The question remains if we can transcend this persistent problem of having to
accept notions of precedence induced by the membership relation, limitations of size,
or any other restriction motivated by the need to maintain consistency. The notion
of complete totality we go on to describe is presented as a possible solution to this
dilemma.
4.1. Beyond Rank Theories and Stratified Formulas. Our objective is to es-
tablish a set conception free from the limitations that characterize the conceptions
surveyed thus far. As we have seen, both the hierarchical conceptions, and Quine’s
NF rely on a notion of precedence induced by the membership relation, either between
the sets as mathematical objects, or syntactically between variables in subformulas.
Otherwise some approaches preserve more basic mathematical intuitions than oth-
ers. Quine demands and delivers a universe of sets with a single type, and without
even a metaphorical notion of precedence of some sets over others. All sets are there
“at once,” and comprehension quantifies over all sets. Quine’s NF supports NWFS
including a universal set, though it does not allow the totalities of non-paradoxical
unstratified properties such as x ∈ x. The hierarchical approach must include a
limitation of size, and reject NWFS. The advantage of cumulative hierarchies is in
the assurance we feel about “aggregating previous sets into new sets or into classes,”
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which is not expected to cause contradictions. The ZF approach which can be inter-
preted as supporting the “creation” of sets by both aggregations and disaggregations,
can allow NWFS using anti-foundation axioms instead of regularity, but this still has
a “limitation of size” limitation.
What we would like to have is a universe of sets which are there “at once,” without
any order on sets or variables within formulas. This implies that we are able to
quantify over all sets when we define sets, and that there is no ontological dependence
between them, so the playground is “leveled.” The universe is a universe of sets which
follow the notion of a totality as expressed by one of Cantor’s definitions for sets that
Boolos quotes [3]: “... a totality of definite elements that can be combined into a
whole by a law.” For the sake of our thought experiment we imagine a procedure
of forming the totality of a certain property by first identifying the sets that comply
with the property and then aggregating them “into a whole.” Of course, none of
this carries any physical or temporal notions, similar to the metaphorical speech of
“forming” sets from “former” sets in the iterative conception which does not carry
such notions either. Note, however, that there is an inherent conflict between a
“Platonic” universe of sets and the seemingly safe action of aggregation which entails
a conceptual difference between the set as a single unified entity and its elements.
Our intention is to take both demands to their extreme, and consider the result, as
odd as it might appear at first glance. Insisting on an application of aggregation in
a way that avoids even a metaphorical notion of a “before” and “after” in the way
we perceive aggregation (such as the one expressed by Boolos’ “Now we have a set”)
will provide an unexpected way to handle the dilemma.
In order to consider the implications of the conflict mentioned above, it is natural
to discuss Russell’s property x /∈ x. The question is of course: does the totality
belong to itself or does it not belong to itself? The contradiction stemming from the
definition of the totality is many times described as a logical derivation that renders
both options symmetric. A careful look shows that things are less symmetric than
they seem. If we follow the thought experiment that first identifies all sets such that
x /∈ x and then forms the totality by aggregating them, we may initially expect that
the resulting set does not belong to itself. This may simply arise from the expectation
that a collection should be different from each of its elements. It may also arise from
the nature of the sets in question, which do not belong to themselves. Even if we
do not expect them to be well-founded, we expect their property to propagate. A
confirmation that this is an impossibility comes from the observation that otherwise
one of the sets we intended to aggregate must have belonged to itself, thus originally
“misidentified” and somehow included in the objects to be aggregated.
The asymmetry becomes evident when we notice that the only way to reach the
conclusion that the totality belongs to itself is by using a logical derivation based on
the property of the totality. The usual argument is: If we assume that the resulting
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set does not belong to itself, it must be a member of the totality. That is, we apply
the creation rule of the collection to itself. This actually has some merit because it
delivers on our promise to avoid any notion of “before” and “after”: if the resulting
set does not belong to itself, why should it be exempt from its own implications?
This would in fact hold also for the singleton of the resulting set and many other
sets that can be theorized using it.
To put it in a way that conforms with the “placeholder” approach mentioned
above, if the resulting set does not belong to itself, we have again “misidentified” a
set, this time by forgetting to identify the resulting set as one of the original elements
that comply with the property, thus we are forced to assume that we originally “had
something there” and got an instance of what we are collecting. According to this
view, at the instant of collecting, the collected identifies with the collection, so the
end result will have itself as an element. We call this “concurrent aggregation.”
There is another way to describe the same effect. We initially expect to get
something which is different than the the sets we try to aggregate, all of which do
not belong to themselves. Hmmmm, it looks like we “forgot” one. Not discouraging,
since we assume there is no “before” and “after” in our universe, we “force it back”
into the initial group of sets we try to collect, and try to aggregate “again,” only
to get another one, and another one, ad infinitum. Each time we aggregate we
get another, bigger, set, and the descending ∈-sequence of these sets gets one step
longer. At the “limit” of this process we get an infinitely descending sequence of ...
indistinguishable sets! Assuming a strong notion of equating NWFS, the result is a
set belonging to itself. According to similar reasoning, the singleton of this set, and
many other sets that contain it in some way, must be members of the resulting set.
What did we get? Well, it is obvious what we did not get. This cannot be the
totality of x /∈ x because it includes sets that do not comply with the property x /∈ x.
On the other hand, the creation of this set does not seem arbitrary, and unlike the
previous situation in which we were unable to respond to the question mark induced
by x /∈ x, we now have something we might want to investigate further. In order
to distinguish the two collections we will call the usual totality an ideal totality of
a property, which is known not to be a set in some cases, and the new collection
the complete totality of a property, which we intend to assert as an axiom to always
be a set. Several immediate questions follow: Is there a way to characterize these
seemingly foreign intruders into the totality? What could possibly be their meaning?
Does the emerging universe of sets seem coherent, what does it contain, and can it
be useful?
4.2. Forming Complete Totalities. Let us try to clarify the idea of a complete
totality. The general idea of a complete totality is that instead of just acknowledging
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all sets that comply with the predicate, we also seek the implications of their collec-
tion. If a hypothetical object, not necessarily a set, created from the ideal totality
and other sets (that is, if I is the ideal totality we will consider structures such as
I, {I}, {I, ∅}, {{I}} etcetera) complies with the predicate, this would indicate the
existence of an additional element in the complete totality. However, that additional
element is not the above hypothetical object, but the set that results from the hy-
pothetical object for which all the occurrences of the ideal totality are replaced by
the complete totality (that is, if C is the complete totality we respectively accept
C, {C}, {C, ∅}, {{C}} as members of C). By “replace” we mean something like us-
ing the occurrences of the ideal totality as “placeholders,” the way placeholders were
described in Sharlow’s broadening of the iterative conception we encountered earlier.
Unlike Sharlow though, we do not keep stages, and we allow the complete totality of
all predicates. The intention is to adopt as an axiom the assertion that all complete
totalities are sets, unlike some ideal totalities.
This concept sounds somewhat complicated, but once the idea of replacement using
placeholders is made clear, all the definitions become simple. We will use an informal
discussion and ad-hoc notation, including the vague notion of “hypothetical object,”
because the intention is only to apply them to important predicates and make some
immediate observations. An informal definition of replacement would be as follows:
Definition 1. The replacement of x with y within S, denoted by Sx→y is:
(1) If S = x, then let SS→y = y.
(2) Otherwise Sx→y = {zx→y|z ∈ S}.
For example, this means, assuming the usual meaning of 2 and ω, that 2∅→ω =
{∅, {∅}}∅→ω = {ω, {ω}}. Even though we know that many more instances of ∅ appear
within ω, those will remain as are and not be replaced, that is, the replacement is
never propagated. Of course, this kind of “definition” only works for well-founded
sets, since according to this there is no way to determine Ω∅→ω where Ω is the
singleton of itself. We will take this definition to mean that if along an infinitely
descending ∈-sequence we encounter the element to be replaced, it is replaced the
first time it is noticed down the sequence. Otherwise the element of be replaced
does not belong to the transitive closure of the object replacement operates on, so
replacement becomes latent, and the end result is identical with that object. Thus
for example Ω∅→ω = Ω, and ΩΩ→ω = ω.
Moving on to the two notions of totality, we have the following:
Definition 2. The ideal totality of a predicate P , denoted by [P ] is the collection of
all sets that satisfy P (x).
Definition 3. The elements of a complete totality of a predicate P , denoted by (P )
are either:
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(1) All sets x such that P (x) holds, are elements of (P ).
(2) For any non-set x such that P (x) holds: if x[P ]→(P ) is a set, it is an element
of (P ).
One might say that the definition of a complete totality is a bit artificial, because
it has two branches. However, both branches go by the same reasoning - if something
satisfies P , “before” or “after” we aggregate, it indicates an element that should be
included. The complete totality simply treats both possibilities as equivalent.
There are two problems with this ad-hoc definition of complete totalities. The first
is that it does not include a way to determine how many non-sets that include [P ] in
their transitive closure we have, that is, it keeps the criteria for “hypothetical objects”
that can be built using [P ] implicit. The second problem is that this definition is
circular. We will see that this circularity will make the definition depend on aspects
of our set theory that may be decided in different ways, such as the notion of set
equality. However, it turns out that many things can be decided about complete
totalities even with such a simple exposition.
We are ready to state the axiom of complete totalities:
Axiom 1. For any property P , (P ) is a set.
This might be seen as an extension of Quine’s NF, once there is also an axiom of
extensionality. However, the analysis of some simple properties we shall soon discuss
may lead to two conclusions that would make such a system different from NF in
aspects other than allowing unstratified formulas. The first one is that it might
be a good idea to use a stronger version of extensionality, which is more suitable
for work with non-well-founded sets. The second one is that unlike NF which allows
formulas that may contain more than one free variable (though, as usual with various
comprehension axioms, the variable that indicates the set formed by the axiom is
rejected in NF), that the properties we want to allow will contain only a single free
variable.
What kind of a universe of sets do we get? An application of the concept to several
important properties will deliver some initial answers. Obviously (x 6= x) = [x 6=
x] = ∅. This must be because any route of acceptance of elements into the complete
totality requires that something satisfies the property in question.
A quick reflection shows that it is easy to create a property (we consider a property
to be at least everything that can be expressed by first order logic formulas in the
language of set theory) that allows any specific well-founded5 hereditarily finite set.
The ideal totality in this case and anything built using it are not expected to satisfy
the property.
5Aczel uses the term hereditarily finite in a way that includes non-well-founded sets.
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An infinite set, in fact ω itself, is created using the property for finite ordinals.
Since the ideal totality in this case is infinite, and all finite ordinals are well-founded
hereditarily finite sets, ω will also be the complete totality. Many more ordinals and
sets required for “everyday mathematics” with well-founded elements of bounded
rank are easily obtained in a similar way.
The universal set can be obtained using x = x. Obviously (x = x) = [x = x]. Note
that we already know that this universal set must be infinite, and contain infinite
sets. It must also contain itself, the singleton of itself, and many other variants which
keep it in their transitive closure. What we get seems to depend on the notion of a
“hypothetical object” which remains obscure, but even if we allow only all structures
that can be built using a finite number of aggregations from [x = x] and all other
sets, the number of combinations is overwhelming. This makes our universal set seem
like a universal set worthy of its name. That is, it is not simply a set that satisfies
the formula ∀xx ∈ y, which is satisfiable even in a model with a domain of size one.
The property Ord of ordinals is interesting both because it is possible to character-
ize a complete totality which is different than the ideal totality even when “possible
structure” remains obscure, and also in terms of the implications of different kinds of
extensionality. Since we know that in this case the ideal totality is an ordinal, apart
from all the ordinals the complete totality will include itself as an element. Can there
be any other elements? Since the successor of the ideal totality is also an ordinal,
replacement will yield a set which includes all the ordinals and the complete totality.
This seems to be exactly the same as what we already have, so we may expect that
all further “successors” and “limit ordinals” (all of which are not sets), must yield an
object similar to the complete totality, which is already included within the complete
totality. It looks as though we can conclude that the complete totality will keep only
the ordinals and itself.
However, if we do the above symbolically we see that identifying the objects created
by replacement with the complete totality depends on our notion of set equality. Let
us try this exercise carefully. For simplicity let α = [Ord] and β = (Ord). Since
Ord(α) and αα→β = β, and β is a set, we have β ∈ β thus α ∪ {β} ⊆ β. We expect
that for all ordinals γ, (α + γ)α→β = β, and we expect that this simply propagates,
so the standard way would be to use transfinite induction. We assume for all δ < γ
that (α+δ)α→β = β. Thus, (α+γ)α→β = (α∪(∪δ<γ{α+ δ}))α→β = α∪(∪δ<γ{β}) =
α ∪ {β}. The only step missing is α ∪ {β} = β, but we do not have it. What we
have is α ∪ {β} ⊆ β. Our analysis shows that once the identity occurs somewhere
it would propagate. Otherwise we get within β a set that our identity relation does
not equate with β, composed of itself and all ordinals. Or we may get that same
situation a finite or an infinite times down an ∈-sequence, depending the identity
relation, and the specific formalization and model. However, fixing a strong sense
of equality between sets (for example by using the anti-foundation axiom with the
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strongest sense of equality described by Aczel) to force (Ord) to be a set containing
all ordinals and itself.
Interestingly, complete totalities make a clear distinction between collecting all
finite ordinals, and collecting all ordinals, based on the fact that the collection of
finite ordinals is infinite, but the collection of all ordinals is an ordinal. It could be
said that complete totalities have their own natural “size considerations mechanism”
which acts upon principle and not upon arbitrary decisions.
Some things are expected not to be the way they are for mainstream systems such
as ZF. Since we have a universal set, just like in NF, we expect that either some
sets do not have a power set, or that it impossible to prove Cantor’s theorem about
power sets always having greater cardinalities. We also know that some aspects of
the system we describe must be more peculiar than NF. For example, in NF each set
has a complement, because the negation of a stratified formula is stratified. However
we know that (x ∈ x) and (x /∈ x) are not disjoint, since (x /∈ x) belongs to both
sets.
What can we expect to have in terms of power sets, union sets, and other methods
of “creating” sets from other sets? An easy exercise shows that there is a limitation
on the properties we can use. Unlike NF, the formulas for the properties we use
for the elements of sets cannot include free variables other than the one we use for
the elements themselves. NF allows parameters inside the properties through free
variables that do not include the variable for the defined set. This is useful for
getting power sets, and performing other set operations. In our case, however, using
the notations we used in the discussion about ordinals, β r {β} would yield a set
α. In formula notation this would happen if we allow the formula x ∈ y ∧ x /∈ x,
in which x describes the elements of the totality, and y is free. If this is allowed
the axiom of complete totalities would mean that there is a complete totality (thus
a set) for the property, whenever y is assigned a given set. Since β is a set, the
property for β assigned to y is about all x ∈ β, such that x /∈ x, and those are the
ordinals. This time the ideal totality of the property, namely α, and all hypothetical
structures containing it, do not comply with the property because they are not in β.
What is the effect of this limitation? Since our original observations were made for
properties of sets and not for properties of sets that have parameters - because the
basic premise was that we should be able to aggregate any group of well defined sets
- there is no dent in the original conception. On a practical level it means that there
is no direct and usual way to assert the existence of sets, given the existence of other
sets. NF always allows a power set this way, and blocks Cantor’s paradox by not
allowing the diagonal set needed for the theorem, and by other conditions that arise
when similar sets with a diagonal set are considered. In our case we simply do not
have a power set for all sets, but power sets for important sets such as ω are easily
created using direct properties. In this case we simply try to create the totality of
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all sets that have only finite ordinals as members, which are equivalent of subsets of
ω. Luckily properties of well-founded sets with a limited rank lend themselves easily
to our procedures. The ideal totalities and the complete totalities become identical
in such cases. It seems that even with this limitation we are not expected to have
trouble defining the sets required for “usual mathematics.”
The picture is getting clearer, and at the same time many questions and possibil-
ities arise. It would be natural to explore other predicates, to offer a mathematical
formalization that handles circularities in a rigorous way and would make all notions
precise, to prove that the formalization is consistent relative to ZF, to seek the im-
plications on large cardinals, and on theorems that cannot be decided using other
conceptions of sets, etcetera. Since the focus of this article is on presenting a new set
conception and on its philosophical advantages with respect to other set conceptions,
we leave the above issues for further research.
4.3. Amiable Circles and the Virgin Paradox. We finish with a few philosoph-
ical observations on the notion of complete totality, which include a consideration
of the legitimacy and meaning of elements that do not comply with a property yet
reside in the property’s complete totality, and the implications of that meaning on
the property. Also, a short note about the philosophical implications of considering
a complete totality to be the “official totality” of a property.
As for the meaning of the additional elements, note that elements of a complete
totality that occur as an act of (non latent) replacement, either ones that eventually
comply or ones that do not comply with the property, are always circular, and all
of them occur as a result of contemplating the implications of having a the usual
ideal totality. The meaning is therefor pointing out circularities within the property
itself. For example, the fact that the complete totality of the ordinals keeps itself
as an element, indicates that the notion of “all ordinals” is in itself an ordinal.
This valuable information about the property becomes embedded into its complete
totality. Reflecting upon Russell’s “viscous circle principle” which states that “no
totality can contain members defined in terms of itself.” [10] we note that the
notion of a complete totality not only rejects this principle, but actively does define
members in terms of the totality in the more problematic cases, which makes the
inherent circularities of the property visible. Instead of adopting an alarming title and
fighting these circularities, one can accept their natural emergence and investigate
them. If titles are of any interest, those can be “amiable circles” just as well.
The legitimacy of keeping elements that do not comply with a property in its
totality was based on the fact that in order for anything to be included in a complete
totality, the property must apply to some object, even if it is only hypothetically
based on the contemplation of the ideal totality. This form of set creation was said
to explore the implications of aggregating all sets that have a certain property, and
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act upon them. It could be argued that this is just a form of mathematical or
conceptual wizardry. How can we see as natural the situation in which an operator
must create a situation that negates the meaning of its operands?
A story titled “the virgin paradox” might make this clear: Randolph Higgins,
better known to his friends as “randy Randolph” for his long history of boasting
his sexual performance, sits in a bar with his friends and claims he had sex with a
virgin earlier that week. None of the participants sees this statement as strange, and
they urge him to deliver details about that incident. This is not a result of them
knowing Mr. Higgins. None of us would find a statement about having sexual inter-
course with a virgin (which literally means a woman that never had sex with anyone)
strange, because even though sex and virgins are somewhat contradictory concepts,
the meaning of the statement is perfectly clear. These concepts are mutually exclu-
sive in the semantic sense, but not mutually exclusive as an actual occurrence. To
have sex with a virgin must be an instant occurrence that at the same time changes
the status of the woman. There is no way to have sex with a virgin if she already
had a man, for she would not be a virgin. There is no way to have sex with a virgin,
and have her change her status at some later time. There is even no exact way to
define the instant of the transformation. This kind of an exact point which is also a
blur could almost be a good proof for the impossibility of sexual reproduction. Yet
we know that sex and virgins mix on a daily basis.
The situation of aggregations, which we mentally perceive to be some kind of
operator, on the one hand, and of a universe of mathematical objects that we prefer
to see as static and unchanging on the other hand, is somewhat similar to the virgin
paradox. This is probably the deeper reason behind set antinomies.
Finally, a note about collectives and meaning. Complete totalities have many mer-
its. They exist for any property, they make hidden circularities evident, and they
are a result of aggregation that takes into account its own implications. Can anyone
claim that complete totalities are “really the” totalities of all properties, even when
they may contains members that do not comply with the property attached to the
same totality? This appears to be a strange philosophical proposition, which is not
required from anyone interested in the purely mathematical aspects of the axiom
of complete totalities. An adoption of complete totalities as “true” totalities would
imply that plurals we address as a single unified entity must have a meaning that
transcends the meaning of the predicate that instigated them. This would be imme-
diately rejected by anyone who perceives sets as nothing more than a combination
of their elements, and even more so by anyone claiming that a set is the same as
its elements6. However, it is possible to argue that not only collectives may have an
6For a support of the latter claim see for example [4].
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independent meaning, but that any collective that may be of any interest must have
one. This argumentation is beyond the scope of this article.
In summery, in this article we have presented a new notion of sets and of total-
ities, complete with its basic motivation, and some of its immediate mathematical
implications. As a philosophical position it offers a new outlook on the reasons for
set theoretic paradoxes. It also delivers a universe of sets close in nature to the naive
conception of set. As a mathematical suggestion, it might be able to offer some new
insights about large cardinals, and about important set theoretic postulates known
to be undecidable in ZF. This is left for further research.
References
[1] Peter Aczel. Non Well-Founded Sets. CSLI, Stanford, 1988.
[2] James Van Aken. Axioms for the set-theoretic hierarchy. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 51(4):992–
1004, 1986.
[3] George Boolos. The iterative conception of set. Journal of Philosophy, 68:215–231, 1971.
[4] George Boolos. ‘Iteration again’. In Logic, Logic and Logic, pages 88–104. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. First published in Philosophical Topics 42 (1989): 5–21.
[5] Meir Buzaglo. The Logic of Concept Expansion. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[6] M. Randall Holmes. The set-theoretical program of quine succeeded, but nobody noticed.
Modern Logic, 4(1):1–47, 1994.
[7] W. V. Quine. On the theory of types. J. Symb. Log., 3(4):125–139, 1938.
[8] Willard V. Quine. New foundations for mathematical logic. American Mathematical Monthly,
44:70–80, 1937.
[9] Willard V. Quine. Set theory and its logic, pages 242–243. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1969.
[10] B. Russell. Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types. American Journal of Mathe-
matics, 30:222–262, 1908. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2369948Electronic Edition.
[11] Bertrand Russell. My Philosophical Development. London, Allen and Unwin, 1959.
[12] Dana Scott. Axiomatizing set theory. In Thomas Jech, editor, Axiomatic Set Theory (Pro-
ceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics XIII.2), pages 207–214. Providence, Rhode Island,
American Mathematical Society, 1974.
[13] Mark F. Sharlow. Broadening the iterative conception of set. Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 42(3):149–170, 2001.
[14] Ernst Specker. Typical ambiguity. In Patrick Suppes Ernest Nagel and Alfred Tarski, editors,
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceeding of the 1960 International Congress,
volume 44 of Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, pages 116 – 124. Elsevier,
1966.
[15] Ernst P. Specker. Dualita¨t. Dialectica, pages 451–65, 1958.
Copyright c© 2011 Rafi Shalom.
E-mail address : rafi.shalom@gmail.com
